

PRUComm Research Seminar on Healthcare Commissioning

**NHS Commissioning Practice and Health
System Governance**

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Themes

- ◆ Commissioning as governance
- ◆ Power and Commissioning: England and Germany
- ◆ Implications

A policy dilemma

How to reconcile ...

- ◆ 'Hollowed out' state – and health system
 - ★ Diversification of providers
 - ★ Cost containment and shifting
- ◆ Political salience of NHS – bed-pan doctrine still applies

The Bedpan Doctrine




'If a bedpan is dropped on a hospital floor in Tredegar, its noise should resound in the Palace of Westminster'

Commissioning as governance 'solves' the dilemma

- Responsibilisation of local managers
- 'Depoliticisation'
- Proxy control and accountability of providers

Commissioners' governance over providers

- ◆ Several media of control in parallel
- ◆ Each one a 'technology of power' (Foucault)
- ◆ Each combination has distinct properties (a 'dispositif')
- ◆ Each combination has distinct particular effects on providers




Commissioners' media of control (power) over providers

- ◆ Managerial performance
- ◆ Negotiated order
- ◆ Discursive control
- ◆ Resource dependency – incentives
- ◆ Provider competition
- ◆ Juridical and regulatory control

Managerial performance

- ♦ Proposing contracts to potential providers
- ♦ Where permitted, select providers.
- ♦ Contract negotiation
- ♦ Audit and monitor provider performance.
- ♦ Maintain transparency of provider activities and costs
- ♦ Private sector managerial inputs (US firms, consultancies)
- ♦ Involve doctors – see below
- ♦ Imitate corporate procurement techniques?



Negotiated order

- ♦ Explicit or tacit division of labour - who participates?
- ♦ Agenda setting, framing, closure
- ♦ Explicit or tacit rights of non-interference
 - pay-back for participation
- ♦ When negotiations recur
- ♦ Psychological tactics
- ♦ 'Relationality' - path-dependent *and* structural basis
 - ♦ High trust > discursive control, transparency
 - ♦ Low trust > non-discursive control



Discursive control

♦ Etic

- ★ Evidence-based medicine
- ★ Epidemiology
- ★ Service and/or financial modelling

♦ Emic

- ★ Professional discipline
- ★ Political authority
- ★ Ideologies (religion, economics, new public management)

Depends on each side having some common discourse(s)



Resource dependency

- ◆ Creates possibility of incentives
- ◆ Depends on:
 - ★ How resource-dependent the provider is
 - ★ What discretion commissioner has
 - ➔ What services to finance
 - ➔ Unit of payment
 - ➔ Payment variations (bonus / penalty)
 - ➔ Conditional payments
- ◆ Spectrum: commissioner-led to passive reimbursement



Provider competition / contestability



- ♦ Accentuates provider's resource dependency
- ♦ Depends on *credible* threat of alternate provision
- ♦ Monopsony – oligopsony – competition – oligopoly - monopoly
- ♦ Commissioners strengthen their position by:
 - ★ Inviting new providers
 - ★ Help establish new providers
 - ★ 'Make' for themselves instead of 'buy'

Juridical control

- ♦ Contract terms – completeness, presentation
- ♦ Appeal to
 - ★ Regulatory and / licensing bodies
 - ★ Political authority
 - ★ Informal arbitrators
 - ★ Courts (administrative, civil, constitutional)



Implications of the mode of commissioning

- ◆ Mode of commissioning = particular combination of the above media of power
- ◆ ... all mediated through provider management.
- ◆ Nevertheless, differences in modes of commissioning *help* explain health system:
 - ★ Patterns of provider development (medical technologies, absences of services, corporatisation, concentration of capital).
 - ★ Capacity for cost control
 - ★ Management of commissioning – medical involvement
 - ★ Development, use of EBM

Research Questions

- ♦ Cross-country comparisons one way to expose and analyse modes of commissioning.
- ♦ Research Questions:
 - ★ How do modes of commissioning differ between the German and English health systems?
 - ★ With what implications for market-based 'reforms', in particular future development of commissioning?

Methods

- ◆ Systematic comparison of two national case studies – England (managed competition), Germany (social health insurance).
- ◆ Data from national, commissioner and provider level in Germany and England, 2011-12
 - ★ Interviews
 - ★ Grey material
 - ★ National events
 - ★ Published data
 - ★ Ad-hoc enquiries to experts
- ◆ Analytic framework is media-of-power schema above
- ◆ Problem of counterfactuals – what would A have otherwise done?

Management: modelling *versus* planning (1)

England (PCTs - and CCGs?)

- ◆ Plan services for geographical population
- ◆ Some collaborative commissioning
- ◆ Cash limits
- ◆ Provider opacity and/or glut of unanalysed information
- ◆ Epidemiologist + GP inputs
- ◆ Voluminous guidance on EBM - used at local level
- ◆ Transaction costs not (publicly?) known

Management: modelling *versus* planning (2)


Germany

- ◆ Land bed-plan constrains commissioners & providers
- ◆ Multiple social health insurers – collaborative
- ◆ Case-mix spread-sheets per hospital – negotiate, re-model, re-allocate *within* overall total
- ◆ SHI can recruit more subscribers
- ◆ Audit and confirmation of payments to hospital, ambulatory doctors
- ◆ Sophisticated almost real-time modelling by commissioners, e.g.
 - ★ volumes of hip replacement revisions per provider
 - ★ disease management programme costs and outcomes for diabetes

Example

3. Data analysis: examples

Early reoperations



Negotiated order: Principal-agent *versus* consensus

England

- ◆ Except for GMS, provider negotiations are local
- ◆ Principal-agent model
- ◆ Wide, flexible remit
- ◆ Some 'micro-commissioning'

Germany

- ◆ HS framework at national, provincial levels.
- ◆ Rhein / Ordoliberal model – consensus + veto
- ◆ BG-A decides which care technologies are in tariff
- ◆ Episode-based

Discursive control: Solidarity *versus* authority

Etic

- ♦ Germany
 - ★ detailed empirical case-mix modelling (D-DRG points, allocations, financial implications)
 - ★ EBM at national level (IQWiG)
- ♦ England
 - ★ EBM guidelines and data at all levels

Emic

- ♦ Germany
 - ★ Professional discipline
 - ★ Juridical rights and obligations (based on 'solidarity')
- ♦ England
 - ★ Central political authority
 - ★ New public management (neo-liberal variants)
 - ★ Professional discipline

Incentives

- ◆ Both systems
 - ★ DRGs for hospitals
 - ★ Points systems for GPs (QOF, Einheitliche Bewertungsmaßstab)
 - ★ Per-diem for certain kinds of long-term care
- ◆ England
 - ★ Additional incentives for hospital quality (CQIN)
 - ★ PCT (and CCG?) discretion and supplements at the margins
- ◆ Germany
 - ★ Nearly all passive reimbursement
 - ★ Except disease management and 'managed care' programmes

Competition

- ♦ England - NHS commissioners can choose providers
 - ★ PCT (and CCG?) controls over/under doctored areas
 - ★ APMS contracts
 - ★ Exceptions – treatment centres
 - ★ Disease management programmes
 - ★ Patient (or GP?) choice of provider
- ♦ Germany - commissioners cannot choose providers
 - ★ Patient choice of provider
 - ★ All licensed episodes per provider must be paid

Juridical control

♦ Germany

- ★ Very complete regulations, entitlements, tariffs
- ★ Incomplete control of clinical practice, quality
- ★ Medizinische Dienst and Schiedsstelle arbitration + courts.

♦ England

- ★ Fairly complete GMS contract
- ★ Other contracts – national framework + 'white spaces'
- ★ NHS contracts – Secretary of State arbitrates
- ★ Courts – only for non NHS providers

Implications - Modes of commissioning

- ◆ Surrogate planning ← 'competitive bidding' quasi-market architecture
- ◆ Case-mix commissioning ← 'social insurance' quasi-market architecture
- ◆ Client-based commissioning – includes 'primary doctor purchasing' quasi-market architecture
- ◆ Others exist


Modes of commissioning, media of power

	<u>Case-mix commissioning</u>	<u>Surrogate planning</u>
Managerial Performance	Case-mix modelling + audit + subscriber marketing.	Service planning for geographical population.
Negotiated order	Consensus, multi-stakeholder model + Episode-based.	Principal-agent + micro-commissioning
Discursive control	Consensus, multi-stakeholder model + Episode-based.	Principal-agent + micro-commissioning
Financial incentives	Fixed tariffs.	Pay for performance (defined prospectively) + <u>ad hoc</u> + fixed tariffs.
Provider competition	None: referral 'framing' at most.	Competition <u>or</u> bilateral monopoly.
Juridical.	Comprehensive regulation + administrative law	Unwritten constitution + common law.

To what effect?

	<u>Case-mix commissioning</u>	<u>Surrogate planning</u>
Evidence based practice	Constrained by tariff	Widespread (but uneven between care-groups)
Care integration	Provider 'silos' + experimental projects	Commissioner 'silos' + micro-networks + experimental projects
Patient choice	Universal	Vicarious + constrained by shortage of provision
Care quality, safety	High, occasional scandals	High clinical, lower for 'hotel' services, occasional scandals
Cost control	Low – only within 'corridors'	High – cash limits
Policy-responsiveness	Low: negotiative + Last-resort political interventions	High: Centralised, politicised

A few more dilemmas



- ♦ Case-mix based commissioning – German *commissioners* cannot exploit provider competition ...
- ♦ ... *because* there is patient choice of provider
- ♦ Cost control requires less provision, competition requires redundancy
- ♦ Different sub-modes of commissioning seem to be required for different care groups



Questions? Comments?

**Sheaff R, Chambers N, Charles N, Exworthy M, Mahon A, Llewellyn S, Byng R & Mannion R
(forthcoming) How managed a market? Modes of commissioning in England and Germany,
BMC Health Services Research.**